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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in Morse v. 
Frederick1 began at 10:03 a.m.2 in typical fashion, like a high-speed game 
of chess.3 Forty-two seconds into the argument, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
cut off the advocate in mid-sentence.4 For the next hour and ten minutes, 
the Justices interrupted the lawyers 152 times.5 Justice Stephen Breyer, a 
former law professor, posed a multi-part hypothetical;6 Justice Ruth Bader 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A. 1995, Yale University. For 
Marisa, who joined me on this adventure. Also thanks to Professors Sharon Rush and Michael 
Seigel, and to Ann Hove, Caroline McCrae, and Ben “Ziggy” Williamson, for their close reading of 
this Note.  
 1. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 2. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, 3, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
 3. KEVIN MERIDA &  MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS 313 (2007).  
 4. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 19, 2007, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-
278), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_278/argument/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.; see Michael Doyle, Wire Service Report, Transcripts Give a Glimpse into Many 
Justices’ Personalities, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, May 16, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
9287415 (describing Justice Breyer as “painfully professorial” and “the most verbose of the 
1
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Ginsburg, a civil procedure scholar, asked about a key detail in the record;7 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s rejoinders drew laughs from the audience.8 
The Court wrestled during the argument with the reach of a student’s 
First Amendment right to unfurl a banner at a school-sponsored, off-
campus event.9 Yet, during the hour-long exchange, no Justice questioned 
the basic premise that students retain some First Amendment rights at 
school.10 However, when the Court issued its opinion, Justice Clarence 
Thomas in a concurrence announced an extraordinary position: that the 
First Amendment does not apply at all to students.11 He wrote that the 
Court should overrule the leading precedent, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,12 which has remained good law 
for thirty-eight years. Justice Thomas’ conclusion surely surprised the 
parties. None had briefed the issue, and Justice Thomas had not asked 
them about it during oral argument. 
In fact, Justice Thomas rarely utters a word from the bench.13 Since 
                                                                                                                     
justices” who has “unleashed nearly 35,000 words during oral arguments since January [of 2007]”); 
see also Jeffrey Toobin, Breyer’s Big Idea: The Justice’s Vision for a Progressive Revival on the 
Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Oct. 31, 2005, at 36 (“Tall, thin, and nearly bald, he radiates 
nervous energy, rubbing his head as he puzzles over questions, and, in sessions at the Supreme 
Court, rocking in his leather chair—sometimes pitching so far forward that his chin almost rests on 
the bench.”). 
 7. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Mar. 19, 2007, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-
278), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_278/argument/. Justice 
Ginsburg taught civil procedure for seventeen years, and enjoys speaking and writing about the 
subject. See Tony Mauro, Seers Forecast Authors of Supreme Court Opinions, 160 N.J. L.J. June 
12, 2000, at 8, 8 (“If one of the pending cases involves civil procedure, Ginsburg might be the 
justice to bet on; she likes the subject.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 60. 
 8. Hear Recording of Oral Argument, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_278/argument/; see also Jay D. Wexler, 
Laugh Track, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 59, 60 (2005) (“Justice Scalia won the competition by a landslide, 
instigating 77 laughing episodes, while Justice Thomas instigated zero laughing episodes . . . .”). 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–58, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). 
 10. Id. at 3–4. Kenneth Starr, the school district’s attorney, argued that the Court could rule 
for the school without altering Tinker. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 25, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 
2618 (No. 06-278). 
 11. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 13. A range of commentators have noted Justice Thomas’ silence at oral argument. See 
MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 309 (“Those who come to the Supreme Court to listen to oral 
arguments for the first time are often struck . . . by Thomas’ nonparticipation. His silence has 
become one of his signature characteristics as a justice and a subject of ongoing fascination . . . .”); 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?,
93 GEO. L.J. 575, 610 (2005) (“Justice Thomas’ comments during oral argument in Black are 
noteworthy both because he rarely asks questions during oral arguments and because of the impact 
those comments had on his colleagues.”); Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, 
First Impressions, 35 HOW. L.J. 115, 128 (1992) (“[A]lthough Justice Thomas generally asked few 
questions during oral argument, such reserve was not present in his writing.”); David G. Savage, 
2
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2004, when oral argument transcripts began identifying Justices by name,14 
Justice Thomas has made just eleven comments15—while sitting through 
more than 400 hours of argument.16 He asked his last question on February 
22, 2006, more than three years ago.17  
Yet, rarely has a Justice said so little but had so much to say. As 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote: “Justice Thomas is the most radical 
member of the current Supreme Court, and likely one of the most radical 
justices in history in his desire to overrule precedent and dramatically 
change the law.”18 Justice Thomas’ jurisprudence would revolutionize 
constitutional law, overturning precedents in areas of criminal procedure, 
the Takings Clause, reproductive rights, First Amendment rights, and the 
separation of church and state, among other areas.19 
This Note argues that Justice Thomas’ profound silence during oral 
argument undermines the Court’s deliberative process—and weakens the 
legitimacy of the far-reaching conclusions, like those in Morse, that Justice 
                                                                                                                     
Say the Right Thing, 83 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (1997) (“Only Justice Clarence Thomas is silent on the 
bench. Roughly once per term, he asks a question during oral arguments. Still, Thomas’ studied 
silence prompts lots of speculation. With his passive expression and long gazes at the ceiling, he 
looks out of place amid his engaged and animated colleagues.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Op-Ed., Personal 
Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35 (“Many of us in the courtroom were 
surprised simply at the sound of his voice; he speaks only four or five times a year, less often than 
most of his colleagues speak during an average morning.”). 
 14. Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcripts (Sept. 28, 
2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_09-28-04.html.  
 15. Since the Court began identifying justices by name  in transcripts on October 4, 2004, 
Justice Thomas has spoken in four cases. S e Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Holmes v. South 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (No. 04-1327); Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Rice v. Collins, 
546 U.S. 333 (2006) (No. 04-52); Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, 51–52, Georgia v. Randolph, 
547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067); Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Veneman v. Livestock 
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (No. 03-1164). 
 16. For cases argued from the October Term 2004 to the October Term 2006, see 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER SUPREME COURT INSTITUTE, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2006 OVERVIEW 10 (2007), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/sci/ 
documents/GULCSupCtInstituteFinalReportOT2006_29June07.pdf. For cases argued during the 
October Term 2007, see Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted Case List (October 
Term 2007) at 13, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/07grantednotedlist.pdf. For cases argued 
during the October Term 2008, see Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted Case List 
(October Term 2008) at 11, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/08grantednotedlist.pdf. 
 17. Adam Liptak, Rare Glimpse of Thomas, From Bench to Den, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, 
at A11; Mark Sherman, Justice Thomas A Man of Very Few Words, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 2007, 
at A5; see supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Posting of Kedar Bhatia to Daily Writ, 
http://dailywrit.com/2007/12/06/updated-oral-argument-statistics/ (Dec. 6, 2007). 
 18. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: Justice Thomas and the First Amendment, First 
Amendment Center (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=19158. 
Professor Chemerinsky writes mainly about Justice Thomas’ First Amendment jurisprudence, but 
he also argues that Justice Thomas “is ready and willing to refashion large areas of constitutional 
law.” Id. 
 19. See infra Part III and text accompanying footnotes 81–122. 
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Thomas reaches without the benefit of briefing or oral argument. By 
removing himself from oral argument, Justice Thomas’ opinions do not 
benefit from the full adjudicative process designed to test theories in open 
court. Many of his opinions, therefore, read less like the product of actual 
litigation, and more like constitutional commentary on issues related to—
but not directly raised in—a case. Justice Thomas’ silence on the bench is 
more than a peculiarity; it allows him to announce new theories of the 
Constitution without vetting those theories in open court. 
This Note focuses on Justice Thomas because his silence is so 
unrelenting, his opinions are so far-reaching, and his position on the 
nation’s highest court is so influential. It argues that Justice Thomas should 
end his silence, both for his own benefit and for the Court’s. 
Part II of this Note discusses the role of oral argument in shaping the 
law and enhancing the legitimacy of the Court. Part III demonstrates that 
Justice Thomas often remains silent during oral arguments even when his 
written opinions depart from precedent and the framework of the Court’s 
debate. Part IV explains how Justice Thomas’ silence removes him from 
the adjudicative process. Part V discusses, and counters, Justice Thomas’ 
reasons for keeping quiet on the bench. Part VI discusses how Justice 
Thomas has used oral argument effectively in one case. 
II.   THE VALUE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Constitution grants the Supreme Court authority to exercise “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States,”20 but it does not tell the Court how it 
should exercise this power.21 Federal law only requires the Court to meet 
each year on the first Monday in October22 with at least six Justices 
present.23 The law does not require the Justices to decide cases,24 r ad 
briefs,25 issue written opinions,26 speak during27—or even hold—oral 
                                                                                                                     
 20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 21. Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit writes that “the 
term ‘judicial Power’ in Article III is more likely descriptive than prescriptive” and does not require 
courts to follow any procedure other than those procedures, such as the right to trial by jury, 
specified in the Constitution. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1161 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also SUP. CT. R. 4.1. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1; see also SUP. CT. R. 4.2. 
 24. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1–5. 
 25. However, the Court has adopted its own rules requiring counsel to submit briefs. 
“Counsel should assume that all Justices have read the briefs before oral argument.” SUP. CT. R. 
28.1. 
 26. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160. 
 27. When a Justice cannot attend an oral argument, the Justice will typically vote in the case 
after listening to the oral argument on audiotape. S e ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE 715 (8th ed. 2002) (citing Justice Kennedy’s participation in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997), after missing oral argument); see also Linda Greenhouse, States’ Rights Defense 
Falters in Medical Marijuana Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A20 (noting that Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, who was suffering from thyroid cancer, would vote in Ashcroft v. Raich, 543 
4
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arguments.28 A Justice could sleep during argument—and apparently some 
have.29 Of course, the vast majority of Justices perform the time-
consuming tasks of asking questions, reading briefs, and writing opinions 
because these endeavors make up the essence of what it means to be a 
judge.30  
Although no law requires it, judges have adhered to the ritual of oral 
argument since the beginning of the republic. American jurists adopted the 
practice from Great Britain, where oral argument still dominates the 
decision-making process.31 In its earliest days, the Supreme Court only 
heard from advocates.32 It did not require parties to submit written briefs 
until 1821.33 The Court’s first arguments could stretch for days.34 Orators 
such as Daniel Webster and Henry Clay would keep packed courtrooms 
spellbound.35 In the famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward,36 Webster spoke for four hours and brought the audience and 
several Justices to tears.37 In Gibbons v. Ogden,38 the Court heard 
arguments four hours per day for five consecutive days.39 The arguments 
turned into social events, drawing large crowds.40 Through the 1920s, the 
Court regularly gave litigants two hours each to present a case.41 Later, the 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. 977 (2004), after reading the briefs and a transcript of the oral argument). Justices are not 
required to listen to the tapes; the fact that they do suggests that Justices consider oral arguments 
valuable. 
 28. In many of the cases resolved on summary disposition, the Supreme Court does not hold 
oral argument. SUP. CT. R. 18.12. 
 29. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes took catnaps during some oral arguments. S e DAVID M. 
O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 260 (5th ed. 2000). Other 
times, Holmes wrote letters during arguments. Id. at 257. 
 30. See generally Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. 
L. REV. 905, 920–22 (2007) (stressing the importance of written decisions because of the inherent 
difference between what is thought and what is written down). 
 31. William H. Rehnquist, “Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art,” 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 
1020 (1983) (noting that a typical British appellate judge sits for oral arguments for more than five 
hours per day, issues opinions from the bench, and participates in oral argument in place of reading 
briefs). 
 32. William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the 
Appellate Brief, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &  PROCESS 1, 1–2 (1999). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 3. 
 35. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 2 (2004). 
 36. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).  
 37. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 1–2; see also FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, 
LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 128 (1994) (quoting Justice Joseph Story’s recollection of the scene). 
 38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 39. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 275 (1987). 
 40. JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 91–92 (1958). 
 41. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION, 
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 61 (1928). 
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Court reduced the time per side to an hour.42 Today, the Court grants each 
party thirty minutes to argue a case, absent unusual circumstances.43 
Though shorter, oral argument still serves an important purpose. 
Citizens line up for hours outside the Court’s front portico to watch, if only 
for a few minutes, the Justices in session.44 For many, the arguments 
symbolize the judiciary at work. Especially in an institution whose 
authority rests on the public’s respect for its position, “[s]ymbols are 
important.”45 In fact, “the symbol of the Court as a fair and just tribunal 
where constitutional arguments will be made and carefully evaluated by 
the justices is a symbol of fundamental societal importance.”46 
Oral arguments also hold the Justices accountable. By forcing judges to 
focus on a case and demonstrate knowledge of it publicly, oral argument 
reassures citizens that judges are doing their jobs, just as calling on law 
students reassures professors that students have read. 
[T]he public nature of the event creates an incentive for 
judges to come to a full understanding of the case so as not to 
appear unprepared or incompetent before the public. In 
addition, the nature of oral argument effectively guarantees 
that the judges will focus their attention exclusively on the 
case under consideration for the full period of the argument.47 
The Court’s deliberative process also legitimizes the Court’s power. 
Since courts cannot command armies or even the U.S. Marshals Service,48 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Id. 
 43. SUP. CT. R. 28.3. Although parties may seek extra time for oral argument, “[a]dditional 
time is rarely accorded.” Id. However, Chief Justice Roberts, who argued 39 cases before the Court 
as a lawyer, has relaxed the rules. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 314. See also Library of 
Congress, Presidential Nominations, John G. Roberts, Cases—Argued, http://www.loc.gov/law/ 
find/roberts.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). In the 2007 term, Chief Justice Roberts gave counsel 
in one case an extra twenty-six minutes—“a bonus of nearly 50 percent that would have been 
unthinkable under his predecessor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was famous for cutting off lawyers in midsentence, even midsyllable, as soon as the red light on the 
lectern came on to signal that time was up.” Linda Greenhouse, Ca  of Texas Murderer Engrosses 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A24; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 39, 
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2007) (No. 06-984). 
 44. Supreme Court of the United States, Visitor’s Guide to Oral Argument at the Supreme 
Court of the United States at 2, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/visiting/visitorsguideto 
oralargument.pdf [hereinafter Visitor’s Guide]. 
 45. HOWARD BALL , JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP OR FIAT? DIRECT OVERTURN BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 144 (1978). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational 
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 766 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 48. The President appoints the U.S. Marshal in each judicial district to provide security in 
United States courthouses. U.S. MARSHALS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. MARSHALS FACT 
SHEET: UNITED STATES MARSHALS 1 (2007), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsh 
6
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the Court depends on the public to recognize the wisdom of its decisions. 
By continuing a tradition that the public has respected for years, oral 
argument gives court proceedings authenticity.49 By involving parties in 
the decision-making process, oral argument makes the Court’s decisions 
more enforceable simply because parties are more likely to obey decisions 
they participated in. As the late Professor Lon L. Fuller wrote, “[T]he 
distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers 
on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of 
presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”50 
Oral arguments also improve the quality of the Court’s thinking. “In the 
judicial process . . . the judge and the advocate complement each other, for, 
as Thoreau said, ‘It takes two to speak the truth—one to speak and another 
to hear.’”51 Indeed, many judges believe the three-dimensional interplay52 
between judges and opposing advocates assists the Court in its search for 
                                                                                                                     
eets/general.pdf. However, Congress delegates to the Court the power to appoint the Marshal to 
help administer the Court and oversee the Supreme Court Police. See 28 U.S.C. § 672 (2006). But 
the Marshal does not have total control over the Court grounds—the Architect of the Capitol does. 
See 40 U.S.C. § 6111 (West 2008) (formerly 40 U.S.C. § 13a (2000)). 
 49. The custom that judges wear robes reportedly began in the 1600s when British judges 
wore black robes to observe mourning in 1685 for King Charles II and in 1694 for Queen Mary. 
Symbols of Authority, Michigan Supreme Court Learning Center, http://courts.michigan.gov/lc- 
gallery/symbols_authority.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). At the first session of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice John Jay wore a black robe with salmon-color facing. Id. Others have described 
a “‘cult of the robe’” that transforms a judge into “a high priest of justice with special talents for 
elucidation of ‘the law.’” WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 13 (1964). 
 50. Oldfather, supra note 47, at 751 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978)). 
 51. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case 
Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 863 (1951). 
 52. Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 1022. Chief Justice Rehnquist compared oral argument to 
the experience of attending a parade in small-town Glover, Vermont. Id. 
It may be that personal attendance at public ceremonies is on its way out, what 
with large cities, television coverage of major events, and the traffic 
congestion . . . . But I am reminded of an event which my wife and I attended this 
summer in northern Vermont; it was the celebration by the town of Glover of the 
two-hundredth anniversary of its founding. . . . None of the events or performers 
came close to the sophistication or talent to be seen on television in the Rose Bowl 
Parade. . . . And yet my wife and I received a completely different sense of 
enjoyment from the celebration at the Town of Glover . . . . It was a three-
dimensional experience, if I may use the term, unlike the two-dimensional 
experience one gets from watching the Rose Bowl Parade on television. 
I wonder if something of the same may not be said for oral argument before an 
appellate court. . . . The sense of immediacy and involvement—the three-
dimensional experience—one gains from such a proceeding is especially 
important to the judges. 
Id. 
7
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truth, in the same way the Socratic method develops minds.53 In England, 
common-law judges believed that rigorous deliberation enabled courts to 
find the law, as a scientist might discover the properties of a molecule.54 
Judges believed they belonged to a discipline that engaged in an exhaustive 
process of research, analysis, and argument.55 “[T]he job of courts is not 
merely one of an umpire in disputes between litigants,” wrote the late 
Justice John M. Harlan.56 “Their job is to search out the truth . . . .”57 This 
search for truth gives a judicial decision a richer character than a police 
officer’s snap judgment or a general’s command.58 
While some judges discount oral argument, scores of Justices and 
judges attest to its value. 59 “The intangible value of oral argument is, to 
my mind, considerable,” the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote.60 
Justice John Harlan described oral argument as “very important” and a 
“frequently underestimated” part of the appellate process.61 Justice Robert 
Jackson wrote that “the Justices would answer unanimously that now, as 
traditionally, they rely heavily on oral presentations.”62 Former Justices 
William Brennan and Harry Blackmun both have spoken about the benefits 
of oral argument,63 as have Justices Antonin Scalia,64 Anthony Kennedy, 65 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 37 FLA. L. REV. 225, 231 (1985) (describing Justice Felix Frankfurter’s idea that the 
idealized appellate process includes oral argument in the Socratic style); see also John M. Harlan, 
What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 6, 7 
(1955). 
 54. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bole v. Horton, (1672) 
124 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1124 (C.C.P.)). See also Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
285, 290 (2009). 
 55. While some commentators see the deliberative process as scientific, others describe the 
process as almost mystical. Former Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote about judges relying on their 
subconscious in deciding cases. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 
(1921).  
 56.  Harlan, supra note 53, at 7. 
 57. Id. 
 58. For a discussion of the role of oral argument in decision-making, see Stephen A. 
Higginson, Essay, Constitutional Advocacy Explains Constitutional Outcomes, 60 FLA. L. REV. 857 
(2008). 
 59. See Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 35, 39–40 (1986). 
 60. Rehnquist, supra note 32, at 1021. 
 61. John M. Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 33 AUSTL. L.J. 108, 115 (1959).  
 62. Jackson, supra note 51, at 801. 
 63. COFFIN, supra note 37, at 135. 
 64. O’BRIEN, supra note 29, at 260. “Things can be put in perspective during oral argument 
in a way that they can’t in a written brief,” Justice Scalia has said. Id. 
 65. Id. Justice Kennedy said that during oral argument “the court is having a conversation 
with itself through the intermediary of the attorney.” Id. He added: 
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John G. Roberts, Jr.,66 John Paul Stevens,67 Ruth Bader Ginsburg,68 and 
Samuel Alito.69 Oral argument proved so valuable for Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr.,70 he often read over transcripts when writing an opinion for the 
Court. 71 
The give-and-take of oral argument sharpens the Court’s concentration 
by requiring judges and counsel to look at each other. In oral argument, 
“you’ve got a chance . . . to talk to them. And see what’s up. And watch 
their faces.”72 In the Supreme Court, the lectern stands just a few feet from 
the Court’s bench,73 removing the distance between the lawyer and the 
nation’s most powerful judges. “[Y]ou are close enough to look someone 
right in the eye,” lawyer Stuart M. Riback wrote.74 “My standing so close 
to the bench made the argument feel almost like a conversation, similar to 
the bull sessions I had with friends in law school, where we sat around 
discussing legal issues.”75 
                                                                                                                     
Does oral argument make a difference? Of course it makes a difference. . . . It has 
to make a difference. That’s the passion and the power, and the poetry of the 
law—that a rhetorical case can make a difference, because abstract principles have 
to be applied in a real-life situation. 
Id. at 261. 
 66. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 69 (2005). 
 67. Video: Inaugural Marshall M. Criser Distinguished Lecture, A Conversation with U.S. 
Supreme Court Associate Justice John Paul Stevens & U.S. District Court Judge Jose A. Gonzalez, 
Jr. (University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.law.ufl.edu/justicestevens/. 
 68. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 FLA. L. REV. 205, 210 
(1985). 
 69. See Joan Biskupic, Alito Puts Rookie Year Behind, Gets a Few Words in, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 1, 2007, at 10A (reporting comments of Justice Samuel Alito on the value of oral argument). 
 70. See JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 97. 
 71. Id. Empirical research also substantiates these impressions. In Oral Arguments and 
Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court, Professor Timothy R. Johnson compared 
oral argument transcripts and briefs to internal Court documents prepared by former Justices 
William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. between 1972 and 1986 to see 
whether justices based decisions on issues raised during oral argument. Id. at 73, 75, 133. He found 
that about 80% of the Justices’ questions at oral argument dealt with topics not raised in the briefs, 
id. at 126, about 45% of the issues discussed during conference came exclusively from oral 
argument, id. at 80, and between 24% and 33% of information in the Court’s majority opinion came 
solely from oral argument. Id. at 98, 99. The percent of information coming only from oral 
argument varied depending on whether amici filed briefs in the case or not. Id.  
 72. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 7 J. APP. PRAC. &  PROCESS 173, 
188–89 (2005). 
 73. See Visitor’s Guide, supra note 44, at 2. 
 74. Stuart M. Riback, First Argument Impressions of the Supreme Court, 5 J. APP. PRAC. &  
PROCESS 133, 149 (2003). 
 75. Id.  
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Oral argument also provides the primary opportunity for the Justices to 
direct the discussion. While counsel sets the agenda by writing a brief, the 
Court controls the conversation by asking questions. Through their 
questions, the Justices focus on the most important issues. Reading a brief 
or listening to a lecture from counsel in silence does not provide the same 
benefit.76 As former Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
You could write hundreds of pages of briefs, and, you are still 
never absolutely sure that the judge is focused on exactly 
what you want him to focus on in that brief. Right there at the 
time of oral argument you know that you do have an 
opportunity to engage or get into the judge’s mental process.77 
Not only do Justices learn from counsel, but they learn from each other 
as well.78 “Oral argument is really the first stage of the conferencing 
among the judges,” wrote former Judge Frank Coffin of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit.79 “By their questions and comments to 
counsel, judges telegraph their concerns and preferences to the other 
judges.”80 
III.   THE SOUND OF SILENCE 
For nearly an hour,81 the Supreme Court grappled with the question: 
Could a federal court require rural Bleckley County, Georgia, to change its 
form of government?82 A group of black voters had sued the county under 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,83 alleging that the countywide system of 
government diluted the strength of black voters.84 By concentrating all 
power in the hands of one commissioner elected countywide, the voters 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See, e.g., E. Barrett Prettyman, Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 
VA. L. REV. 285, 298–99 (1953). 
 77. Bright, supra note 59, at 36–37.  
 78. REHNQUIST, supra note 39, at 277. “The judges’ questions, although nominally directed to 
the attorney arguing the case, may in fact be for the benefit of their colleagues.” Id. Justice 
Ginsburg listens to colleagues’ questions for concerns she might address; she also asks questions to 
persuade colleagues. Ginsburg, supra note 68, at 210–11. “I will not deny that questions may be 
framed to elicit a concession, which later turns up in a footnote to the opinion . . . .” Id. at 210. 
Justice Brennan agreed: “I have had too many occasions when my judgment of a decision has 
turned on what happened in oral argument, not to be terribly concerned for myself were I to be 
denied oral argument.” COFFIN, supra note 37, at 135. “It is not rare that a justice says in conference 
that oral argument turned me around,” Justice Blackmun said. Id. 
 79. COFFIN, supra note 37, at 133.   
 80. Id. at 132–33. 
 81. Hear Recording of Oral Argument on Oct. 4, 1993, Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) 
(No. 91-2012), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_91_2012/argument/. 
 82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2–6, 46–47, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012). 
 83. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 84. Holder, 512 U.S. at 877–78. 
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alleged that the system sapped the strength of black citizens, who made up 
about one-fifth of Bleckley’s population.85 During oral argument, the 
Justices questioned how a federal court could justify creating a five-
member commission, rather than, say, a three-member commission.86 Why 
couldn’t the Court create a ten-member commission?87 Justice Kennedy 
asked: Hadn’t the court simply added enough seats to ensure that an 
African-American got elected?88 
“No sir,” replied Christopher Coates, an attorney for the black voters.89 
The lower court had enlarged the commission to five members based on 
statewide standards90—in Georgia, all but eleven of 159 counties had five-
member commissions.91 
As the Justices turned the question over, Justice Thomas sat in 
silence.92 Yet, when the Court released its opinion, Justice Thomas, as he 
would later do in Morse, analyzed the case from an entirely new 
perspective—one never broached in briefs or raised in oral argument.93 
Justice Thomas wrote in a sixty-five page concurrence94 that the Court 
should engage in “[a] systematic reexamination” of the Voting Rights 
Act.95 Although the Court had not accepted certiorari on the question,96 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Brief for the Petitioners at 4 & n.2, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012); see also Bill 
Torpy, Sole Commissioners Fading Lawsuit Against Bleckley County Threatens 10 of 19 Left in 
State, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 5, 1992, at A1. 
 86. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 3–4, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012).  
 87. Id. at 36–37. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 38. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 34, 38. 
 92. David G. Savage, Ginsburg Shines in Debut on High Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at 
16. 
Ginsburg’s performance contrasts vividly to that of Justice Clarence Thomas, 
the justice who preceded her to the court. Thomas rarely participates in the 
arguments. 
Now beginning his third year on the bench, Thomas usually rocks back in his 
chair and seemingly pays little attention to the arguments. In three days on the 
bench this week, he did not ask a single question. 
While Ginsburg quizzed the lawyers in the mine safety case . . . Thomas 
rubbed his eyes often and gazed at the ornate ceiling. 
At the time of the argument in Holder, Justice Thomas had not said a single word on the bench for 
an entire year. David G. Savage, In the Matter of Justice Thomas: Silent, Aloof and Frequently 
Dogmatic, Clarence Thomas’ Judicial Persona Emerges, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, (Magazine), at 
14 [hereinafter Savage]. 
 93. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012); Brief 
for the Petitioners at 13, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012). 
 94. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 891–955 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 914. 
 96. The question presented by Petitioners was: “Whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
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Thomas wrote that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited courts from 
ordering any voter-dilution remedies at all, even though courts had been 
ordering those remedies for thirty years.97 Discounting a 1986 precedent,98 
Justice Thomas found that the Voting Rights Act did not prohibit “voter 
dilution.” He instead believed the law only prohibited practices that 
affected the ability of minority voters to cast a ballot and have their ballot 
counted.99 He wrote: 
We have involved the federal courts, and indeed the Nation, 
in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country into 
electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of 
segregating the races into political homelands that amounts, 
in truth, to nothing short of a system of “political 
apartheid.”100 
Justice Thomas had not hinted during oral arguments that black voters 
in his home state of Georgia supported political apartheid. Nor had Justice 
Thomas suggested that he wanted to reverse years of case law. As in 
Morse, Justice Thomas had not given the attorneys before him the 
opportunity to be heard on any of his theories. 
Justice Thomas’ silence might not be insidious if it did not permit him 
to offer a far-reaching revision of constitutional law. “Justice Thomas’ 
willingness to hit the constitutional ‘reset’ button and start over from 
scratch is not confined to” one or two cases.101 He has written opinions that 
would overturn the constitutional order in First Amendment law, both in 
free speech cases and religious freedom cases; in Sixth Amendment law; in 
Fifth Amendment Takings law; and in the jurisprudence of reproductive 
rights.102 Justice Thomas would also dramatically scale back the power of 
                                                                                                                     
holding that governance by a single county commissioner, rather than a multi-member board of 
commissioners, is subject to challenge as dilutive under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 1973.” Brief for the Petitioners, Holder, 512 U.S. 874 (No. 91-2012). 
 97. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 892 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 98. Justice Thomas said he would have overturned the leading precedent on the issue, 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Holder, 512 U.S. at 885–86 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“We know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2.” (citation 
omitted)). Additionally, in five other cases, the Court found the size of government to be “a 
‘standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting’ under § 5” of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 
886; see also id. at 957–66, 960 n.2 (Stevens, J., separate opinion) (pointing out that Congress 
reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1970 after the Court determined the Act should not be narrowly 
construed). 
 99. See id. at 955 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 905 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
 101. Thomas C. Goldstein, Justice Thomas: Constitutional ‘Stare Indecisis’, First Amendment 
Center (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=19133. 
 102. Id.  
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the federal government under the Commerce Clause103 by preventing 
Congress from passing laws governing agriculture and manufacturing.104 
“Justice Thomas’ approach to constitutional law is that he is thinking 
about—more important, rethinking—profound questions. And he is willing 
to embrace what are, under current law, radical new approaches. He packs 
hand grenades, not scalpels, in his constitutional satchel.”105 
He throws his grenades in surprise attacks. In Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow,106 a case in which a parent challenged the mandatory 
recital in public schools of the words “One nation under God” in the 
pledge of allegiance,107 Justice Thomas failed to ask any questions during 
oral argument. Nevertheless, in his opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the 
First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion applied 
only to the federal government.108 Thus, Justice Thomas argued, the 
Constituion does not prevent states from establishing official state 
religions.109 
Justice Thomas did not ask a single question either in Go zales v. 
Carhart,110 in which the Court upheld a federal statute banning certain 
abortion procedures.111 Yet, Justice Thomas suggested in concurrence that 
Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to regulate abortion at 
all.112 In Kelo v. City of New London,113 Justice Thomas did not ask a 
question during oral argument even though he wrote in his dissent that he 
would undo decades of jurisprudence that govern the Fifth Amendment’s 
                                                                                                                     
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 104. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 100 
(2007); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584, 587, 590–91 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that Congress lacks the power to regulate gun possession, agriculture, and manufacturing). 
 105. Goldstein, supra note 101. 
 106. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 107. Id. at 4–6. 
 108. Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 49–50. Even more remarkable, Justice Thomas reached such a sweeping conclusion 
in a case where the Court found the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. See id. at 17–18. 
 110. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 111. Id. at 168. 
 112. Id. at 168–69 (Thomas, J., concurring). At least in Gonzales, which consolidated Carhart 
and its companion case, the issue that Justice Thomas raised in his concurring opinion had been 
briefed by amici and raised by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens during oral argument. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 20–23, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 05-1382); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Cal. Med. Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 3, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 05-1382). 
Ironically, Justice Thomas did not vote to strike down the federal statute because, he wrote, the 
issue of the statute’s constitutionality as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
had not been raised below. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring). The lack of briefing 
has not stopped Justice Thomas from deciding issues in other cases. See upra Parts I, III. In 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, the District Court had actually raised 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause to regulate abortion. 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1012 
(N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 113. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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Takings Clause.114 In Hudson v. McMillian,115 Justice Thomas did not ask 
any questions about his belief—expressed later in dissent—that the 
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment does not 
prevent prison guards from beating inmates.116 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island,117 Justice Thomas—without a word during an oral 
argument—cast aside the Court’s long-standing Central Hudson 
commercial-speech test118 in favor of a categorical rule against restrictions 
on advertising intended to influence consumer spending.119 In Doggett v. 
United States,120 Justice Thomas wrote that the Constitution’s guarantee of 
a speedy trial does not protect a defendant who waited eight years for trial 
due to the prosecutor’s delays.121 Yet, during oral argument, Justice 
Thomas did not say a word to hint how he would re-write the Constitution. 
This behavior follows a practice: Justice Thomas’ revision of the 
constitutional order emerges from his chambers without exposure to public 
debate. 
IV.   THE EFFECT OF SILENCE 
Despite his silence on the bench, Justice Thomas speaks through his 
writing with perhaps the richest and clearest voice of any current Justice. 
His opinions are forceful, his reasoning is cogent, and his positions appeal 
to core American virtues such as self-reliance. Yet, Justice Thomas’ 
opinions often read like position papers—if not manifestos—because 
Justice Thomas’ views are so far removed from the oral adjudicative 
process that engages the rest of the Court. Oral argument, and the Court’s 
other deliberative traditions, usually force the Court to decide a case within 
a record and on the question presented to the litigants. Justice Thomas’ 
nonparticipation in oral argument leaves him unrestrained to advocate far-
reaching theories never contemplated by the litigants. 
On one level, Justice Thomas’ disengagement from oral argument is 
simply unfair to the litigants. As former Chief Justice Charles Evan 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 115. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 116. Id. at 18–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth Amendment only applies to 
sentences, not post-sentence treatment of inmates). 
 117. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 118. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1089–90 (3d ed. 2002).  
 119. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
id. at 517–18 (Scalia, J., concurring); David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The 
Emergence of a Commercial-Speech Protector, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 485, 496–98 (2002). See 
generally Transcript of Oral Argument, 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484 (1995) (No. 94-1140) 
(discussing repeatedly the Central Hudson test). 
 120. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).  
 121. Id. at 669–71 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Hughes wrote: Advocates “prefer an open attack to a masked battery.”122 If 
Justice Thomas holds a strong view of the law in a case, he should offer it. 
Litigants could then counter it, or try to do so. It is not enough that Justice 
Thomas merely attend oral argument if he does not participate in argument 
meaningfully. The tradition that a court engage in oral argument rests on 
the same principle of fundamental fairness123 that generally requires a court 
to refrain from deciding a question without the benefit of argument or 
briefing.124 
As a question of fairness, reconsider the argument in Morse v. 
Frederick,125 in which Justice Thomas listened for an hour as counsel 
answered the other Justices’ questions—none of which touched upon the 
fundamental shift in First Amendment law that Justice Thomas advocated 
in his concurring opinion.126 In Holder v. Hall,127 Justice Thomas allowed 
counsel to pursue an hour-long line of argument that proved utterly 
irrelevant to his thinking. He never once asked about the scope of the 
Voting Rights Act, even though his theory of the Act’s scope would have 
sweeping implications. In Missouri v. Jenkins,128 Justice Thomas accused 
African-American parents of acting on a theory of racial inferiority because 
the parents sought a court order to integrate schools.129 Yet, when Justice 
Thomas stood a few feet away from the parents’ lawyer, Theodore M. 
Shaw, an African-American who has spent his career litigating civil rights 
cases,130 Justice Thomas did not ask Shaw a single question about his 
theory of racial inferiority. By preventing Shaw from hearing his theories, 
Justice Thomas deprived Shaw of the chance to challenge those theories 
before the case concluded. 
                                                                                                                     
 122. HUGHES, supra note 41, at 62.  
 123. Courts have long considered the right to be heard a fundamental element of fairness. JACK 
H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 183 (9th ed. 2005).  
 124. Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2002). See generally Arthur Selwyn 
Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of 
Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (1975) (“If the 
real information base for decision is not revealed to counsel and to litigants, the Court is deprived 
of the reaction of counsel to that information.”). 
 125. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 126. See supra Part I. For a rich analysis of student speech rights after Morse, see Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008), and Emily Gold 
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored 
Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 127. 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
 128. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 129. Id. at 119 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 130. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., News, Biographies, Theodore M. 
Shaw, http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=47 (last visited Feb. 18, 2009); see also Fred 
A. Bernstein, The Future of Diversity, COLUM. NEWS, June 4, 2007, 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/07/06/diversity.html. 
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Justice Thomas’ opinions and his silence transform him almost into a 
commentator on the Constitution, rather than an adjudicator of questions 
presented in cases. The Court’s deliberative traditions, such as oral 
argument, act to restrain judges—so they concentrate on facts presented by 
litigants. Justice Thomas’ non-participation fails to display the judicial 
“modesty” prized by jurists.131 “The premise of our adversarial system is 
that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and 
research,” wrote then-Judge Antonin Scalia in 1983.132 “Th[is] 
rule . . . distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial 
one.”133 Justice Thomas has himself acknowledged that “the Court should 
not pass on [issues], even in dicta, without the benefit of the parties’ 
briefing and argument.”134 
A judge’s conduct must be egregious to violate a litigant’s due process 
rights.135 Justice Thomas’ non-participation in oral argument falls short of 
that constitutional bar. After all, due process should not serve as a 
straightjacket on appellate judges. The law should let Justices and judges 
adopt their own styles in deciding cases—within limits. By nature, some 
Justices will be more talkative than others will. Some may be oral learners; 
other may think by writing. As Justice Thomas has pointed out, Justices 
Marshall and Powell spoke only occasionally during oral argument136—
although they never sat silent for years as Justice Thomas has. 
At the same time, Justice Thomas’ abandonment of oral argument 
should not be treated merely as another personal preference. His silence, 
taken to an extreme, undermines the judicial process too severely to be 
entirely ignored. His conduct falls in a gray zone, short of due process, but 
beyond personal prediliction. While due process does not enshrine all the 
                                                                                                                     
 131. For a discussion of judicial modesty, see William H. Pryor Jr., The Perspective of a 
Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1020–21 (2008). 
 132. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 133. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United 
States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 134. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 221 (1999) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not rule on Minnesota’s authority to regulate the 
activities of the Chippewa Indian tribe on land ceded in an 1837 treaty). 
 135. A judge violates due process only when her conduct “offends some principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); see 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (ruling that a judge cannot constitutionally hear a 
criminal case when the judge is paid only if he convicts the defendant). For example, a judge who 
acts as both prosecutor and adjudicator may violate due process. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 
53 (1975). Likewise, a judge should not preside over a case where she is the victim. Del Vecchio v. 
Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1392 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Nor 
should a judge exercise contempt powers over a litigant where the judge is “embroiled in a running 
controversy” with the litigant. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). 
 136. Steve Kroft, Clarence Thomas: The Justice Nobody Knows, 60 MINUTES, Sept. 27, 2007, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/27/60minutes/main3305443.shtml?source=search_story.  
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/5
2009] JUSTICE THOMAS AT ORAL ARGUMENT 627 
 
customs of adjudication into law, the common law traditions of written 
opinions and oral argument underpin the structural role under Article III of 
the Constitution that judges play as independent arbiters of the law. The 
Constitution grants judges independence and life tenure137 b cause we 
expect judges to follow common law traditions designed to create a 
deliberative judiciary. By jettisoning one part of this deliberative tradition, 
Justice Thomas undermines the limited role that judges play in our system 
of government. 
V.  “M Y COLLEAGUES SHOULD SHUT UP!” 138 
Justice Thomas’ silence on the bench may be the most puzzling because 
he remains one of the most outspoken Justices off the bench.  Court 
employees describe Justice Thomas as gregarious and good-natured—he 
talks to everyone, including the janitors, learns the names of each law clerk 
every year, and will opine for hours about law and sports with students he 
invites back to his chambers.139 Justice Thomas’ autobiography is perhaps 
the most candid of any Supreme Court Justice in history. In it, he discusses 
how he toyed with suicide,140 how as EEOC chairman he could not pay his 
American Express bill,141 how he despaired over his first failed 
                                                                                                                     
 137. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.  
 138. Speaking at Hillsdale College in Michigan, Justice Thomas urged his colleagues to “shut 
up” during oral argument, although he suggested the comment was a joke. Posting of Mike Nizza to 
The Lede, Notes on the News, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/clarence-thomass-case-
for-shutting-up/ (Nov. 30, 2007, 11:59 EST). 
 139. TOOBIN, supra note 104, at 103. 
 140. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON 173 (2007). Justice Thomas wrote: 
I sometimes wonder how I got through the summer of 1983 without falling 
apart. As we say in Georgia, I was lower than a snake’s belly . . . . The mad 
thought of taking my own life fleetingly crossed my mind. Of course I didn’t 
consider it seriously, if only because I knew I couldn’t abandon Jamal as I had 
been abandoned by C. 
Id. 
 141. Id. at 174. As a nominee for Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights, Justice 
Thomas was “on the brink of financial ruin.” Id. at 139. He wrote: 
But even after I paid the bill, American Express cut me off. From then on Diane 
had to book me into hotels that would accept cash. On one of my trips to 
Massachusetts to attend a meeting of the Holy Cross board of trustees, I tried to 
rent a car at the Boston airport with an old Sears credit card. The clerk at the 
Budget rental desk called the company, then told me that Sears had ordered him to 
destroy the card. He cut it up on the spot as I looked on in horror. I had to beg him 
to let me rent a car so that I could get to my meeting. 
Id. at 174. 
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marriage,142 and how he drank himself into misery, spending “too many 
nights in the early eighties, drinking alone in a dreary efficiency 
apartment” in Washington.143 
Justice Thomas has offered personal, as well as philosophical, 
explanations for his silence. Yet, each explanation, instead of clearing the 
mystery, makes his conduct even more enigmatic. 
For incidence, Justice Thomas has traced his reluctance to speak to his 
childhood. Growing up in Georgia, he spoke a dialect called Geechee that 
made it difficult for him to master standard English.144 Because of his 
accent, Justice Thomas rarely talked in grade school. He said he preferred 
to listen.145 His shyness continued at Yale Law School, where he marveled 
at the self-confidence of his classmates.146 Yet, Justice Thomas’ 
explanation of his adolescent fear of public speaking hardly justifies his 
shyness as an adult.  Certainly, Justice Thomas is not the same man he was 
as a child. As a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, then-Judge Thomas actively participated in oral 
argument.147 In fact, since his appointment to the Court, Justice Thomas 
has demonstrated his public speaking prowess. At times, he can hold an 
audience spellbound. On the day in 1991 that President Bush nominated 
him to the Court, then-Judge Thomas, overcome by emotion, stopped 
twice as he told a nationwide television audience about his impoverished 
upbringing in Savannah.148 When confronted with allegations of sexual 
harassment during his confirmation hearing, he accused the Senate 
Judiciary Committee of conducting a “high-tech lynching.”149 His defiant 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. at 145, 150, 175.  
 143. Id. at 145; see also id. at 158. 
 144. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 315–16; THOMAS supra note 140, at 34.  
 145. TOOBIN, supra note 104, at 106. 
 146. THOMAS, supra note 140, at 71. 
 147. Savage, supra note 92.  
 148. Maureen Dowd, Conservative Black Judge, Clarence Thomas, Is Named to Marshall’s 
Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A1 (“When Judge Thomas stepped up to the microphone, 
his hands clasped tightly in front of him, he had to stop speaking twice, as he tried to thank his 
grandparents, sharecroppers from rural Georgia, who had raised him in a tenement with no indoor 
plumbing.”). 
 149. Most famously, he told the committee in response to accusations of sexual harassment by 
former employee Anita Hill: 
This is a circus. It is a national disgrace. And from my standpoint, as a black 
American, as far as I am concerned, it is a high-tech lynching for uppity-blacks 
who in any way deign to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have 
different ideas, and it is a message that, unless you kow-tow to an old order, this is 
what will happen to you, you will be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a 
committee of the U.S. Senate, rather than hung from a tree. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the United 
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tone and direct language gripped the nation.150 
A.  Decorum 
By allowing advocates to speak without interruption, the Court is 
simply being polite, Justice Thomas has said.151 The barrage of questions is 
rude.152 “[W]e look like the Family Feud,” Justice Thomas has said.153 “If I 
invite you to argue your case, I should at least listen to you.”154 He 
explained: 
There are times I’ve gone across the country, and I’ll meet a 
small town lawyer who says, “You know, I was up at your 
Court and they never let me say what I wanted to say.” That 
isn’t what I want to hear. I prefer to hear, “I made it all the 
way to Court and I got to tell you what I really thought.”155  
To be sure, no litigant will be heard if the Justices all talk at the same 
time.156 Oral argument should not be a version of The McLaughlin 
                                                                                                                     
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 157–58 (Oct. 11, 1991) (statement of 
nominee). 
 150. More than 27-million people in homes watched Thomas’ Senate confirmation hearings on 
Sunday night, compared to 9.2-million people in homes who watched the Major League Baseball 
game aired on CBS. Joel Kurtzman, Business Diary/October 13–18, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, § 
3, at F2; see also Bill Carter, Why the Thomas Hearings Were a Sometime Thing on TV, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, at E3. 
 151. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 314. 
 152. See id.  
 153. Id. at 312; see also Alan Cooper, Thomas: Internet Offers New Issues, RICH. TIMES 
DISPATCH, May 20, 2000, at B3. 
 154. Id.   
 155. Posting of Jan Crawford Greenburg, Thomas and Oral Argument, Legalities, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/legalities/2007/10/thomas-and-oral.html (Oct. 9, 2007, 16:50 EST). In 
fact, Justice Thomas has suggested that the practice of quizzing counsel from the bench may not 
even be appropriate for the profession. Washington Whispers, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/wash 
ington-whispers/2007/11/29/this-is-not-perry-mason.html (Nov. 29, 2007, 13:02 EST). Justices 
should behave more like surgeons, he told an audience at Hillsdale College in Michigan in 2007. Id.
Suppose you’re undergoing something very serious like surgery and the doctors 
started a practice of conducting seminars while in the operating room, debating 
each other about certain procedures and whether or not this procedure is this way 
or that way. You really didn’t go in there to have a debate about gallbladder 
surgery. You actually went in to have a procedure done. 
Id. 
 156. Justice Thomas is not alone in this criticism. During oral argument in Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), Justice Breyer repeatedly asked counsel questions that Justice 
Scalia answered. After Justice Scalia answered the counsel’s questions several times, Chief Justice 
Roberts interjected. He told counsel: “I think you’re handling these questions very well.” The 
audience laughed. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, Danforth, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2007) (No. 
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Group.157 Justice Thomas may be right that Justices should allow counsel 
to finish their sentences. He may be right that some Justices hog the hour 
of argument—Justice Scalia even acknowledges he talks too much.158 
More decorum would enhance oral argument. But it makes no sense for 
Justice Thomas to respond to the cacophony by saying nothing—ever—for 
years at a time.  
Justice Thomas’ brand of hospitality does not serve the advocates or the 
deliberative process well, either. His courtesy is short-lived. In the long 
run, his silence is not actually polite if it enables him to cut counsel out of 
the decision-making process. Better to interrupt the advocate with a point 
that matters than let her carry on with an irrelevant lecture. Most lawyers 
would rather learn about a Justice’s concern, rather than have his concern 
concealed.159 
B.  Listening 
Justice Thomas argues that he listens to counsel by letting them talk. 
However, this reasoning misconceives the nature of oral argument. Oral 
argument is not surgery, as Justice Thomas has suggested, where silence 
facilitates concentration.160 The tools of oral argument are the questions. 
Attorney Carter G. Phillips, who has argued more than fifty cases before 
the Court,161 has heard the same complaints that the Justices interrupt too 
much.162 Phillips wrote that “[p]eople walk out of the Court and say, ‘That 
was unbelievable. I got up there with five brilliant points that I just had to 
make, and those guys just kept interrupting me . . . .’”163These lawyers fail 
                                                                                                                     
06-8273). 
 157. Other Justices agree with Justice Thomas’ criticism of the Court’s aggressive questioning. 
During argument on October 10, 2007, in Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008), a capital case, 
Justice John Paul Stevens asked his colleagues to hold off asking new questions until counsel had 
answered his old questions. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Medellin, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2007) 
(No. 06-984). “It’s critical to me to understand the effect of the judgment, and you said there are six 
reasons why it’s not an ordinary judgment,” Justice Stevens asked the lawyer representing the state 
of Texas. Id.“I really would like to hear what those reasons are without interruption from all of my 
colleagues.” Id. 
 158. “It is the academic in me,” Scalia said, “I fight against it. The devil makes me do it.” 
O’BRIEN, supra note 29, at 261. 
 159. Interestingly, in his autobiography, Justice Thomas writes with disdain for people who 
conceal their racial views. “At least southerners were up front about their bigotry: you knew exactly 
where they were coming from, just like the Georgia rattlesnakes that always let you know when they 
were ready to strike. Not so the paternalistic big-city whites . . . . Like the water moccasin, they 
struck without warning . . . .” THOMAS, supra note 140, at 75–76. 
 160. See Washington Whispers, upra note 155.  
 161. Sidley Austin LLP, Our People, Carter G. Phillips, http://www.sidley.com/ourpeople/det 
ail.aspx?attorney=123 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
 162. Carter G. Phillips, “Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court,”  15 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 177, 190 (1998). 
 163. Id.  
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to understand that a court communicates by interrupting. “[O]ne should 
realize . . . [y]ou now have a perfect window into the minds of the Justices. 
They are telling you exactly what is bothering them.”164  
Justice Thomas’ view of oral argument overlooks the fact that by the 
time counsel appears before the Court, the Justices have already heard 
from the counsel—in the form of a 15,000-word brief.165 The Justices, who 
have already read the brief, 166 gain little by listening to counsel recite the 
brief’s contents again. As the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote:  
An oral advocate should welcome questions from the bench, 
because a question shows that at least one judge is inviting 
him to say what he thinks about a particular aspect of the 
case. . . . If oral argument provides nothing more than a 
summary of the brief in monologue, it is of very little value to 
the Court.167  
Writing years before Justice Thomas’ appointment, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained, “If the judge simply sat silent during the oral 
argument, there would be no opportunity for the lawyer to correct the 
factual misimpression or to state his reasons for interpreting the particular 
case the way he does.”168 
C.  Keeping an Open Mind 
Justice Thomas simply does not consider oral argument an important 
part of the deliberative process. “It’s not a necessary part of the job,” he 
told Newsweek.169 “[It is] ‘really not a critical part of the process.’”170 By 
the time Justice Thomas sits for oral argument, he said he has already 
discussed the case with his law clerks, and read the briefs, the lower court 
opinions, and the record.171 He does not need to hear from counsel to make 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Id. 
 165. SUP. CT. R. 33.1(g)(v). 
 166. Supreme Court of the United States, Guide for Counsel in Cases to be Argued Before the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Part II, at 9, 11 (Oct. Term 2008), www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf, reprinted in STERN, supra note 27, at 983, 985 (“You should 
assume that all of the Justices have read the briefs filed in your case, including amicus curiae 
briefs. . . . Ordinarily, counsel for the petitioner need not recite the facts of the case before 
beginning argument. The facts are set out in the brief and they have been read by the Justices.”). 
 167. REHNQUIST, supra note 39, at 279.  
 168. Id. at 277. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist was not commenting directly on Justice 
Thomas’ practice when he wrote this comment in 1987, four years before Justice Thomas’ 
appointment to the Court.  
 169. Lally Weymouth, A Justice’s Candid Opinions, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2007, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/43358/output/print. 
 170. Greenburg, supra note 155 (quoting Justice Thomas). 
 171. Id. 
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up his mind on the law. “‘I know what I think without having heard 
argument or anything else,’” he said.172  
Justice Thomas’ stunning explanation underscores how his silence 
undercuts the adjudicative process. It leaves the impression that he comes 
to court with his mind closed. By appearing at oral argument with the 
outcome already determined, Justice Thomas might as well not attend the 
sessions at all. If oral argument does not influence a Justice or change his 
mind, at least occasionally, then the argument simply serves as theater. 
It seems unbelievable that Justice Thomas genuinely has no questions 
to ask about any of the nation’s most difficult cases. Even the most learned 
judge with well-developed outlooks on the law should have questions.  
Just as scientists have not discovered all of the great ideas in 
physics, and historians constantly unearth materials that give 
us a better understanding of previous eras, in the law it would 
be surprising if we were at the “end of history” with nothing 
profound left to be realized and announced.173  
Indeed, Justices such as Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg ask 
scores of questions.174 Even though these Justices have firm philosophies 
of the law, they do not pretend to possess all the answers to the law. It 
demeans Justice Thomas to believe that his inquiry into the law has 
reached an end, and it belittles his individuality to believe that Justice 
Thomas can keep quiet because some other Justice will ask the same 
question he might pose.175 
Even Justice Thomas’ friends think he and the Court would benefit if 
he engaged advocates more often.176 “‘Listen, I can’t figure it out,”177 said 
Charles Fried, a Harvard Law School professor.178 “‘I think it’s a shame, I 
think it’s a pity . . . . It’d be good for him . . . . Because I think that when 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. (quoting Justice Thomas). Ironically, Justice Thomas regularly cites in his opinions 
statements made during oral arguments. According to one study, he cited oral argument transcripts 
in 68 of 323 opinions between the 1994 and 2007 terms. Frederick Liu, Citing the Transcript of 
Oral Argument: Which Justices Do It And Why, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 32, 33–34 (2008). 
 173. Goldstein, supra note 101. 
 174. Doyle, supra note 6. 
 175. Amazingly, Justice Thomas has given this explanation for his silence. MERIDA &  
FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 315. “‘[U]sually, if you wait long enough, someone will ask your 
question.’” Id. (quoting Justice Thomas). 
 176. See id. at 310–11. 
 177. Id. at 310. 
 178. Professor Fried has seen oral argument from both sides of the bench, as a former justice 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and as U.S. Solicitor General during the Reagan 
Administration. Harvard Law School, Faculty Directory, Charles Fried, http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/faculty/directory/facdir.php?id=21 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
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you get into that it affects you and maybe it changes you a little bit . . . and 
he would learn from it.’”179  
D.  Broadening the Debate 
Through his silence, Justice Thomas not only evades the deliberative 
process, but he also diminishes his own influence. Justice Thomas’ silence 
allows advocates to ignore him and his views. Because Justice Thomas 
rarely commands majorities in major cases180 and, in fact, often takes 
lonely stances in dissent,181 his silence makes it even less likely that 
colleagues and scholars will take stock of his perspective. By sitting on the 
riverbanks, critics can too easily cast Justice Thomas as out-of-the-
mainstream. Yet, Justice Thomas’ silence should not be ignored simply 
because his opinions often end up in dissent. Dissents matter and can 
profoundly affect the direction of the law. Many of the truths accepted 
today began as dissents.182 Moreover, if Justice Thomas wants thinkers to 
take his ideas seriously, then he should use every tool at his disposal, 
including oral argument, to showcase his ideas and steer the direction of 
debate.  
The Court’s discussion grows richer when Justices broaden the debate. 
For the Court to work at its best, the Justices should constantly exchange 
ideas, and not just those ideas that sit in the center of legal thought. Indeed, 
“[f]or the law to mature and prosper, profundity needs to come from all 
ideological directions, and indeed from directions that defy ideology 
altogether. Genuine intellectual truth emerges from a vigorous competition 
between contested ideas; it is not conjured from thin air . . . .”183 Precisely 
because he stands alone, Justice Thomas’ participation in oral argument 
might benefit the Court’s deliberations. Because of his willingness to 
rethink the constitutional order, Justice Thomas would force the Court to 
reconsider basic premises. Whether the Court casts away its ideals or 
reaffirms them, the process of rethinking essential questions exemplifies 
the highest calling of a court of law. 
                                                                                                                     
 179. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 311 (quoting Charles Fried) (third omission in 
original). 
 180. See TOOBIN, supra note 104, at 102. Justice Thomas frequently uses concurrences and 
dissents to invite litigants to raise novel theories in later cases. Se , e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 168–69 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 181. TOOBIN, supra note 104, at 102. 
 182. For example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes uttered the maxim that “the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” in dissent. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Today, the sentiment 
serves as the foundation of First Amendment law. MARC A. FRANKLIN , DAVID A. ANDERSON &  
LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW 9–12 (7th ed. 2005).  
 183. Goldstein, supra note 101. 
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E.  Diminishing His Stature 
Finally, the practice of sitting silent during oral argument detracts from 
Justice Thomas’ reputation. His silence makes it easy to cast him as an 
intellectual lightweight. When Justice Thomas sits in silence, he can 
appear to the public as arrogant, rude, or uninformed. Consider this picture 
from Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki.184 Counsel, two of whom were 
making their first appearance at the Court, 185 might have expected Justice 
Thomas to be interested in the case, as it dealt with regulations issued by 
the EEOC, which Justice Thomas led from 1982 to 1990.186 Perhaps, 
Justice Thomas—who did not ask any questions during the spirited 
argument187—was immersed in the case. Yet, he did not display any 
interest at all.188 He did not even look at counsel during argument.189 “As 
the other justices puzzled over regulations adopted during his tenure there[, 
Justice Thomas] leaned back in his chair and stared at the ceiling.”190 
Justice Thomas’ actions make it look like he is unprepared for 
argument, even though that is undoubtedly not the case. Consider the 
impression left on eleven students from Benjamin Banneker High School 
in Washington D.C., who came to the Court for a field trip.191 “‘I thought 
he was meditating,’’’ one student said.192 “‘He was spinning around in his 
chair like a child,’” another said.193 “‘Maybe he stayed up all night reading 
the court case—he was tired,’” a different student said.194 Still, one high 
school student said Justice Thomas’ conduct just looked “‘[w]eird . . . . [I]f 
you know people are going to be watching you, you’d think you should try 
to make yourself presentable.’”195 
 
                                                                                                                     
 184. 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008). 
 185. Linda Greenhouse, Job Bias Case Turns on Filing Right Form, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2007, at A25.  
 186. Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court at 2, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
 187. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 70, Federal Express Corp., 128 S. Ct. 1147 (No. 
06-1322) (listing zero references in the transcript index for Justice Thomas). 
 188. Perhaps, Justice Thomas’ manner of thinking about a case simply appears idiosyncratic. 
He may be concentrating on the case even as he looks away from counsel. Even so, appearances 
matter. 
 189. Justice Thomas is not the only justice in the history of the Supreme Court to ignore 
counsel. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 310. Former Justice William O. Douglas piled 
books in front of him during oral argument so he could duck behind the stack and do other work. 
Id. 
 190. Greenhouse, supra note 185. 
 191. MERIDA &  FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 320. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 321. 
 195. Id. 
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VI.   THE POWER OF WORDS 
One might sit out oral argument if it were irrelevant. Yet, the best 
evidence of oral argument’s ability to shape a debate comes from Justice 
Thomas’ selective use of the forum. When Justice Thomas does speak 
during oral argument,196 he changes the terms of the debate.197 Until 
Justice Thomas injected himself into the argument in Virginia v. Black,198 
a challenge to a Virginia statute that outlawed cross burning,199 many 
observers expected the Court to declare Virginia’s cross-burning law 
unconstitutional.200 The Court could have done so by applying two 
precedents:201 Texas v. Johnson,202 which struck down a law making it a 
crime to burn the American flag,203 and in doing so characterized flag-
burning as expressive conduct, and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,204 which 
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting the display of symbols such as a 
swastika and burning cross.205 The facts of the two cross-burning cases 
were remarkably similar: In R.A.V., teenagers burned a cross in the yard of 
an African-American family who lived across the street.206 In Black, 
petitioners burned a cross in the yard of an African-American neighbor.207  
During argument, Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben attempted 
to characterize cross-burning as the type of expressive conduct that the 
First Amendment does not protect.208 Justice Thomas interrupted:209 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 196. For other examples of Justice Thomas’ comments during oral arguments, see Alyssa 
Work, Justice Clarence Thomas: Oral Arguments in First Amendment Cases, First Amendment 
Center (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?id=18926. 
 197. Lithwick, supra note 13 (Justice Thomas’ “words changed the tenor of the debate, if not 
the minds of his colleagues, about the role of the law and the definition of justice.”). Ironically, 
Lithwick argues that Justice Thomas improperly injected race into the argument by his charged 
comments. Id. 
 198. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 199. See Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 893–94 (2005) 
(describing the facts of Virginia v. Black). 
 200. See James L. Swanson, Unholy Fire: Cross Burning, Symbolic Speech, and the First 
Amendment Virginia v. Black, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 81, 86 (2003). 
 201. Id. 
 202. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 203. Id. at 400, 420. 
 204. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 205. Id. at 393. 
 206. Id. at 379. 
 207. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 350 (2003). 
 208. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 01-1107). 
 209. Id. at 21–24; hear also Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 11, 2002, at 23:23 to 25:00, 
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-1107), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2002/2002_01_1107/argument/. 
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[JUSTICE THOMAS]: [T]his statute was passed in what 
year? 
 
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.210 
 
[JUSTICE THOMAS]: Now, it’s my understanding that we 
had almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the South by 
the Knights of Camellia and—and the Ku Klux Klan, and this 
was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of that reign 
of terror. [I]sn’t that significantly greater than intimidation or 
a threat? 
 
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice 
Thomas, because it is— 
 
[JUSTICE THOMAS]: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that 
you’re actually understating the symbolism . . . . I think that 
what you’re attempting to do is to fit this into our 
jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross 
was intended to accomplish and, indeed, that it is unlike any 
symbol in our society. . . . 
 
There was no communication of a particular message. It was 
intended to cause fear . . . and to terrorize a population.211 
The comments from Justice Thomas, the only Justice who grew up in 
the South under the Klan’s shadow,212 transformed the tone of the case.213 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-1107); hear also 
Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 11, 2002, at 23:23 to 25:00, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-
1107), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1107/argument/. By 
asking the question, Justice Thomas raised a point he would bring up again in his opinion. See 
Black, 538 U.S. at 393–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In 1952, the same Virginia government that 
banned cross burning, nevertheless supported legalized segregation and, two years later, would 
engage in “massive resistance” to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Id. “Even for 
segregationists, violent and terroristic conduct, the Siamese twin of cross burning, was intolerable. 
The ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate demonstrates that even segregationists 
understood the difference between intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression.” Id. at 
394.  
 211. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–24, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-1107); hear also 
Recording of Oral Argument on Dec. 11, 2002, at 23:23 to 25:00, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-
1107), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1107/argument/. By 
signaling that he believes the case should not fit within the Court’s framework of precedents, 
Justice Thomas gave both counselors the opportunity to argue whether the Court should depart 
from precedent.  
 212. THOMAS, supra note 140, at 21–22, 35, 46, 257. Besides writing about his experience 
growing up under the specter of the Klan, Justice Thomas also included in his autobiography a 
black-and-white photograph of a highway sign in Smithfield, North Carolina, that advertised the 
United Klans of America Inc. Id. at 179. The sign read: “Help Fight Communism & Intergration 
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As the New York Times reported on the “made-for-television” moment:  
During the brief minute or two that Justice Thomas 
spoke . . . the other justices gave him rapt attention. 
Afterward, the court’s mood appeared to have changed. While 
the justices had earlier appeared somewhat doubtful of the 
Virginia statute’s constitutionality, they now seemed quite 
convinced that they could uphold it as consistent with the 
First Amendment.214 
Undoubtedly, Justice Thomas could have made the same point in his 
written opinion, or in the Court’s private conference. By speaking during 
oral argument, he forced his colleagues—and indeed the nation—to 
reconsider the case through his eyes. His words prompted his colleagues to 
confront the history of the Klan. This “three-dimensional exchange,” as the 
late Chief Justice Rehnquist described it, epitomized the way oral 
argument assists the Court in the search for truth.215 
Arguably, because of Justice Thomas’ comments, the law changed, too. 
Perhaps in direct response to Justice Thomas’ uncompromising view on 
the limits of expressive conduct, the Court in Black announced that a state 
could outlaw cross burning by crafting a statute more narrowly than 
Virginia had.216 Even though Justice Thomas dissented in Black (he would 
have gone further—and given cross burning no expressive content worthy 
of First Amendment protection at all),217 many commentators credit Justice 
Thomas with moving the Court’s center of gravity in the case.218  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
A lawyer’s journey to oral argument at the United States Supreme 
Court begins in the morning outside the four-story, Vermont marble 
                                                                                                                     
[sic] Join & Support United Klans of America Inc. KKK Welcomes You to Smithfield.” Id. In the 
caption that accompanies the photograph, Justice Thomas points out the error in the ad: “Note the 
spelling of integration!” Id.  
 213. See also Lithwick, supra note 13. Lithwick wrote that “with his personal narrative, Justice 
Thomas changed the terms of the legal debate.” Id. 
 214. Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 215. Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 1022. 
 216. The Court invalidated Virginia’s statute only because the law impermissibly made the act 
of cross burning prima facie evidence of intimidation. Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48, 367. A statute 
that did not create the same prima facie presumption—but required the state to make an 
individualized showing that the defendant had burned the cross to intimidate—would be 
constitutional. Id. at 365–67. 
 217. Id. at 388, 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 218. Charles, supra note 13, at 610. “One cannot help but believe that Justice Thomas’s active 
participation . . . best explains the Court’s decision to turn away from the absolutist position of 
R.A.V. . . . .” Id. 
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building that houses the Court.219 Forty-four steps carry the lawyer up to 
the front portico, through bronze doors, and into the Great Hall, where 
busts of former Chief Justices gaze out at visitors. 220 Oak doors open into 
the courtroom, with its forty-four foot ceiling and twenty-four columns of 
Old Convent Quarry Siena marble.221 When an attorney’s case is called, 
she proceeds to the lectern in front of the Justices’ mahogany bench and 
stands in silence until the Chief Justice calls her by name.222 Even for the 
most seasoned lawyer, this passage to the Supreme Court remains an awe-
inspiring experience.223 The Court’s majesty underscores how everything 
about a case before the nation’s highest Court remains elevated in the 
public imagination. This is why the sight of Justice Thomas’ stubborn 
silence strikes such a dissonant chord. 
Justice Thomas’ silence damages the deliberative quality of the Court 
in the forum where the Justices should be acting most judiciously. His 
silence prevents counsel and colleagues from challenging his sweeping 
proposals to transform the constitutional order. His silence allows him to 
offer far-flung views in written opinions that are never vetted in oral 
argument or, in some cases, never raised in briefs. While Justice Thomas 
may find it more comfortable to keep quiet during oral argument, his 
silence undermines the development of the law. Law grows through 
argument, oral and written. If Justice Thomas spoke more often during oral 
argument, he might convince the Court to adopt his vision of the 
Constitution. Or his participation might cause the nation to reject his 
radical re-working of constitutional law. Either way, giving voice to an 
unheard viewpoint elevates the Court and honors the majesty of the 
judicial process. Justice Thomas’ voice carries “in a rich baritone,”224 
which is deeper and more authentic than anyone’s on the Court. For his 
sake and for the nation’s, he should use it more often. 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Visitor’s Guide, supra note 44, at 1. Supreme Court of the United States, The Court 
Building at 1, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/courtbuilding.pdf.  
 220. Id. at 2.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See generally Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) 
(statement of nominee). 
 224. Greenhouse, supra note 185. 
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